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From Katanga to.Quebec to the Jura of Switzerland to
Armenia, new secessionist movements rise to the surface while
others rejuvenate after a certain period of hibernation.
Secessionists movements have become a menace to the international
political order by creating anarchy and conflict.

They are

fueled by a basic human aspiration for self-determination.
As a phenomenon, secession has been around for centuries.
However, the post World War Two and post Cold War eras provided
fertile ground for their growth, as the colonial powers
arbitrarily carved out non-assimilated people and formed
artificial sovereign states.
Several political analysts have been using the terms
secession and separatism interchangeably.

At this point it

would be wise to differentiate between several political
phenomena, which all swamp the pure issue of secession.
Secession is demand for formal withdrawal from a central
political authority by a member unit on the basis of a claim
to independent sovereign status (Beran 1984, Heraclides 1992
and Wood 1981).

The aim is to redraw the boundaries instead

of moving out of the control of the host state.

Separatism

is merely demand for formal autonomy (Heraclides 1992).
Irredentism refers to formal withdrawal from one state in order
to join another.

Buchanan (1991b, 10) wants to eliminate this

distinction between secession and its special exception,
irredentism.

However, this distinction is essential as the

state that wants to accept the minority in question adds
complexity to the whole dispute.
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as the receiving state may be looking at economic or military
gains, such as oil fields or mountains suitable for natural
defense against the host state (Buchanan 1991b).
To this date there have been sporadic attempts to categorize
and analyze past and present secessionist movements in order
to predict future attempts.

This study attempts to formulate

a concise theory on the justifiable reasons for secession, then
presents several secessionist movements through a historical
perspective and finally attempts to critique and categorize
them according to various degrees of legitimacy of secession.
A theory of secession should contain several elements.
It should include the preconditions of secession, the rise of
secessionist movements and the effectiveness of their actions,
the response of central governments, confrontational developments
between the secessionist unit and the host state and finally,
resolution of secessionist crises based on certain normative
rules (Wood 1981).

This essay deals in part with the resolution

of the secessionist crises and in particular with their
legitimacy in the international arena.
to answer an old but fundamental

The theory will attempt

question.

How do we as members

of the international community respond to such claims?
is a secessionist movement legitimate?
comparative.

When

The purpose is ultimately

This framework will give us gUidance.

Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) have used their
power

and influence in the past to support certain secessionist

movements, while crushing others.

Therefore, political

scientists need to start using the same standards to all future
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secessionist movements.
for moral

However, providing a list of reasons

legitimacy of secession will not suffice.

has to be established.

A scale

The more conditions a secessionist

movement satisfies, the more sound the legitimacy for secession
will be.

However, every secession case needs to be checked

individually.

Secession has a moral character and it always

has a right and a wrong.
It is interesting to note that none of the great
philosophers of history such as Marx, Mill, Locke, Rousseau,
Plato, Hobbes or Hegel have given much thought to the idea of
secession (Buchanan 1991b and 1992), while the notion of self
determination has been traced to Aristotle (Kampelman 1993).
During the 16th and 17th century Althusius claimed secession
was possible in order to avoid tyranny and Pufendorf advocated
that the ruler had absolute sovereignty and therefore, groups
could not secede (Beran 1984).

A convenient explanation may

be that they may have never had to face a secession case.

A

great deal of state disputes were resolved by the military.
It was not until the American Civil War that political
philosophers carne to realize a relatively new phenomenon
(Buchanan 1992).
was unheard of.

After all, political divorce from a state
Nevertheless, a complete and systematic

political analysis on secession was still in its infancy.
A theory on the legitimacy of secessionist movements is
desperately needed within the international political arena.
The media bombards people every day with news of new and
resurging secessionist movements.

The 90s has experienced a
3
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rash of uncontrolled nationalism, which may have disastrous
effect on the international political order (Buchanan 1991b,
2)•

This theory has to be practical first and normative second.
It will defuse and possibly solve problems of indefinite
divisibility of minority populations.

As long as there are

major differences between populations, the potential for the
development of secession remains viable.

The international

community will be able to help stranded or trapped minorities
that have become weak politically or militarily.

A practical

theory on the legitimacy of secession may put an end to the
fear of indefinite divisibility of states (Heraclides 1992)
and to the creation of inviable political and economic entities
(only due to absence of free trade) and thus may prevent the
addition of stress to the already strained economic arena.
It may prevent any damage to the will of the majority or the
minority by not allowing anyone of the parties to blackmail
the other.

Finally, it may end inappropriate action taken by

IGOs and streamline their efforts (Heraclides 1992).
Self-determination, diversity and the pursuit of liberty
place highly on the agenda of liberalism (Buchanan 1991b, 4).
However, liberalism does not recognize group rights as it relates
to secession (Buchanan 1991b, 7), which is inconsistent with
the notion of accepting freedom as the ultimate political value
(Beran 1988).

Birch (1984) claims that individuals have the

right of voice in a democratic state which falls in line with
self-determination.

Nevertheless, secession is attempted by
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cultural groups when their host state does not include them
in the decision-making process, as will be shown in the case
studies later on.

Beran (1988) points out that if individuals

have the right of voice, then according to liberalism, they
should automatically have the right to exit.
A report by an International Commission of Jurists published
in 1972 went so far as to suggest that the right of secession
can only be exercised once (Kampelman 1993).

Birch (1984) also

claims that once individuals are committed to a state, that
they should have substantial grievances in order to justify
their exit.
is

Political association is not unalterable and

created to satisfy the needs of the people that live within

it (Buchanan 1991a).

The exceptions include the inviability

of the new state (only due to absence of free trade),
exploitation of sub-groups within it, and inability to recognize
other potential secessionist movements in the future (Beran
1988).

However, Beran (1988) does not permit the secession

of an area which is culturally, militarily and economically
essential to the host state and contains a high share of the
economic resources.

Beran (1984) writes that Dahl and Tufte

have shown that there is no relationship between the viability
of the state and its size, because no one state depends
exclusively on a single resource.

Therefore, it should not

be a point of interest whether a secessionist movement wants
to abstract a high share of resources or value from the host
state, as the latter will still survive through trade.
In the early 1900s, the League of Nations endorsed minority
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group rights in general, short of secession.

Even Woodrow Wilson

did not endorse secession, except in the case of colonialism
(Kampelman 1993).

Roosevelt advocated that self-determination

did not imply fragmentation of a nation (Kampelman 1993).
A change occurred during the interwar period as Hitler
abused his notion of minority rights.

He justified his conquests

of Checkoslovakia and Poland by invoking the rights of German
minorities.

Therefore, after 1945 the international community

treated minorities as merely cultural groups without any
political clout.

The United Nations supported national

self-determination on the one hand, but refused to support any
secessionist movements in the developed world.

Its aim was

to end colonialism in the Third World peacefully, mostly because
the states that emerged from the era of colonialism were
arbitrarily carved without any considerations for the ethnic
groups involved (Buchanan 1991b, 20 and 1992).

The U.N.

Anti-Colonial Declaration of 1960 disapproved of any attempt
to fragment the national unity of a state (Heraclides 1992).
Nevertheless, it has recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia in spite of its earlier claim.

Since the advent

of the Jewish .holocaust, the U.N. has pushed aside its dogma
on minority rights and has pushed human rights instead (Buchanan
1992).

International law recognizes only sovereign states and

their individuals.

It would be violating the principle of

non-intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign
country, thus causing international anarchy (Buchanan 1992).
Self-determination refers only to the right of a majority
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within a political unit to the exercise of power.

Any

association between the right of self-determination and the
right of secession by the U.N. would have brought international
anarchy to the Cold War era, as the US would support one side
and the Soviet Union the other (Buchanan 1992).

States and

other IGOs have the capacity to act indirectly as intermediaries,
as in the case of the Tutu and Houtsi in Rwanda.

They can act

as providers of humanitarian aid, as in the city of Sarajievo
Bosnia.

Lastly, they can take the side of the majority or the

seceding minority group.
In a democratic framework an individual has the right to
choose his own government.

Beran (1988) points out that liberty

is a fundamental political value and that the willingness of
its citizens should be the only concern to the international
community.

However, practically this world can only support

the growth of a finite number of viable sovereign states.

What

criteria should the international community use in order to
accommodate the minority group?

This theory on the legitimacy

of secesionist movements does not prevent any cultural group
from attempting to secede, but serves to guide the United Nations
and other IGOs into supporting cultural groups that have a high
level of legitimacy.

Buchanan states (1991b, 21 and 1992) that

illegitimate minority groups may potentially seek out milder
alternatives to secession first, such as limited autonomy,
federalism, confederalism.

Secession is legitimate only under

certain circumstances that will be discussed in the theory below.
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The Theory
First, the legitimacy of a secessionist movement depends
upon the presence of a defined territory.

Buchanan (1992) states

that a contiguous majority within the previously defined
territory and the application of the Harm Principle, which does
not allow interference with a group of individuals so long as
their decisions do not harm others, are desirable elements that
increase the legitimacy of the seceding group.

Furthermore,

the seceding group may accommodate the minority within that
territory, by buying their property and protecting their
interests and rights of expression, religion, association, due
process and participation in political processes in case they
decide to remain as citizens of the seceding nations (Buchanan
1991b, 29-30).

Therefore, the existence of a seceding majority

within a defined territory increases the legitimacy of that
group.
Second, Buchanan (1991b, 32) says that John Stuart Mill
has argued that diversity makes a contribution toward social
utility (Buchanan 1991b, 32).

However, the result of the

increased level of diversity that the new state brings will
be realized only through the permeability of its external
barriers.

Foreign trade, intercultural associations and

membership in international organizations are some factors that
bring about a change in permeability, thus increasing global
diversity.

The argument for increased diversity becomes stronger

when the seceding cultural group has no political representation
in the host country.

Therefore, the increased diversity that
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the seceding group brings to the world increases its legitimacy.
Third, the original states that formed the union in America
.had set some goals.

During the Civil War some of the states

saw fit to secede from the union because it did not measure
up to their expectations.

The exit of a seceding group from

a state may be possible when the state is no longer able to
satisfy the original goals and expectations upon which the state
was formed.

Buchanan (1991b) states that the seceding group

may be allowed to immigrate or secede with their land especially
if the seceding group was a sovereign state at the time of entry.
Therefore, the seceding group gains legitimacy when their goals
and expectations have changed over time.
Fourth, Buchanan states that certain states systematically
draw resources from one group and deposit them with another
on purpose (Buchanan 1991b, 40).

This unequal treatment creates

a net flow not only of money but of manpower as well from one
region of the country to another.

In contrast with Buchanan's

(1992) suggestion that a transfer from the rich citizens to
the poor citizens is not an injustice, many other means exist
by which a government can increase the standard of living of
poor areas without transferring resources from the rich to the
poor.

For example the government can transfer technology for

new industrial complexes and thus create new jobs in the poor
areas.

It can educate individuals and return them to their

homeland to prosper.

However, discrimination on the part of

the government, or even lack of
process of secession.

respect, might accelerate the

Change occurs when something does not
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function right.

The power exercised by the government ends

where the unjust exploitation of a certain number of its citizens
begins (Buchanan 1991b).

Therefore, the seceding group gains

legitimacy in cases of discriminatory redistribution.
Examples of discriminatory redistribution include the Basque
region in Spain which has been paying three times the percentage
of state expenditures.

The Biafra region in Nigeria contained

22% of the population, contributed 38% of the revenues while
it received only 14% of the state expenditures.

Furthermore,

the Katanga region in Congo contributed 50% of the revenues
while it received only 20% back.

Discriminatory redistribution

occurs on an environmental basis as well as economic.

There

have been numerous reports from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
which cite high birth defect rates as a result of the
concentration of Soviet heavy industry (Buchanan 1991b, 1991a
and 1992).
Fifth, history provides evidence of overextented political
units swelling to empires.

As the empire grows larger it becomes

unable to cope with the increasing number of problems from the
countryside.
resources

Therefore, the empire's administrators focus their

and time on the problems of their major cities.

Therefore, the efficiency of the public administration
infrastructure declines.

Renaissance cities such as Florence

and Venice were incorporated into greater nation-states because
they were too small to protect their trade routes (Buchanan
1991b, 45-46).

Today, small and weak states rely on

international bodies for their protection
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One of the subordinate reasons the Soviet Union broke up was
due to decreased efficiency within the seceding states.

Mass

quantities of grain and other products spoiled in their storage
bins because they could not reach the big cities in time due
to transportation deficiencies and inefficient administration.
Therefore, the anticipation of increased efficiency of public
administration by the seceding group increases its legitimacy.
Sixth, the United Nations Charter (Article 1 and 55), the
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the United Nations International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights proclaim a right for
self-determination for all people.

The key word is people.

It refers to groups of individuals that have a common culture,
religion, shared traditions, language, ethics, customs and above
all history.

The people form the basis for a nation.

These

factors differentiate the term nation from the political
boundaries of a country.

Unfortunately, there are very few

places in the world that are homogeneous.
of nations occupy a common area of land.

Often, a mixture
Unlike a sovereign

state, the boundaries of a nation are quite fuzzy.

With the

advent of the information superhighway the boundaries become
even fuzzier, as cultural elements from one nation enter another.
For example, are German-Americans living in the US members of
the German nation?

What about the individuals that satisfy

some but certainly not all of the features that constitute a
nation?
Ethnic identities can be object of political manipulation
11
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(Wood 1981).

In F.Y.R.O.M. (Macedonia), for example, the

Yugoslav leader Tito forged a nation called Macedonia to serve
his political ambitions of keeping Macedonia as a state within
the Yugoslav federation.

Several groups consisting of Greeks,

Bulgarians and Albanians had developed irredentist views after
the second World War aspiring to join their respective nations.
Therefore, the existence of features of primordial nationalism
within a seceding group increases their legitimacy.
Seventh, a cultural group may vie for secession if they
feel that their culture is truly threatened from extinction.
A culture's value is determined by its contribution to the lives
of the people who live by it and by the people who indirectly
come into contact with it (Buchanan 1991b, 52).

However, a

culture may only be saved when the individuals within that
culture want it saved and when it is beyond their capacity to
act.

Examples include, the Armenians of Turkey which have been

systematically slaughtered and the French-speaking citizens
of Quebec which are assimilated by the English-speaking Canadians
(Buchanan 1991b, 55).

Once secession is successful the new

constitution can warrant a right of exit in the future for
various ethnic groups living within it by providing difficult
but surmountable

barriers (Buchanan 1992).

The region can

be allowed to secede only if the vast majority decides that
it is wise to do so (Birch 1984).

An important factor in the

decision is the presence of a distinctive economic interest
(Hechter 1992).

An exception to the rule would be cultures

that are so violent and anti-human that should not warrant
12
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preservation, such as the Nazis (Buchanan 1991b).

Therefore,

the preservation of a distinct culture by a seceding group,
when other alternatives to secession are not available, increases
its legitimacy.
Eight, many times the majority within the host state or
a second sovereign state act aggressively toward the minority
group and threaten to exterminate it.

The host state may not

be willing to apply any defensive measures in order to stop
the aggression.

Therefore, the minority group wants to secede

in order to prepare its own defense against the aggressor by
strenghtening its economic and military status, by asking for
aid from other states and IGOs (Buchanan 1991b, 65).

An

excellent example is the case of the people of Armenia that
inhabit parts of Turkey, Iraq, Syria.

Two weeks ago the Turkish

army invaded the northern province of Iraq in order to
exterminate certain leaders of the Armenian Liberation Army.
Iraq does not think highly of the Armenian people and does not
want to oppose the Turkish invasion.

Therefore, the Armenians

want to secede from all three states and form their own sovereign
state.

Therefore, the anticipation of threat from an external

to the seceding group source increases the legitimacy of that
group to secede in order to defend itself from the aggression.
Nine, the minority group may have been a sovereign state
until the time it was unjustly annexed by another state.
Buchanan (1991b) points out that the secession is simply the
reappropriation of stolen property by the rightful owner.

This

statement begs the question of who is the rightful owner.

The
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Soviet Union annexed the three Baltic Republics of Latvia,
Estonia and Lithuania during World War two.

In 1991 the three

republics declared their claim to secession by arguing that
the territory was unjustly taken by the Soviets.

However, how

old does the claim to ownership have to be in order to be valid?
The claim of the Baltic Soviet Republic was valid for two
reasons.

First they were annexed as a result of a unilateral

declaration of war and second they existed as sovereign states
before the annexation trying to do everything in their power
to avoid the conflict.

Therefore, the legitimacy of the seceding

group increases when it claims to reappropriate stollen property
or territory.
Finally, the theory of liberalism proclaims that each people
has the right of self-determination.
occupying this Earth is large.

The number of nations

Practically, the number of

potential nations far exceeds the number of viable states, even
though there is no direct relationship between the viability
of a state and its size.

The wealthy states that are small

in size became wealthy before they were reduced in size.
opposite may not be true.

the

The United Nations is flooded with

applications for financial aid to Third World countries.

U.N.

resources have been stretched to the limit after the humanitarian
aid missions to Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda.

Therefore, the

international community has to look into the survivability of
these aspiring and emerging secessionist movements.

Nationalism

is on the rise as new cultural groups learn from the mistakes
of the old ones.

The ease of success of secessionist movements
14
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in the former Soviet Union has provided the spark for the
emergence of new groups.

Issues that were previously not

discussed within the framework of the seceding group now receive
the center of attention.

Some may want to refer to Monaco or

Cyprus which have a population of less than a million.
Nevertheless, these countries had a strong and relatively
homogeneous society as well as a powerful economy.

Therefore,

the legitimacy of the seceding group increases when it is wealthy
and/or favors free trade
Before examining the legitimacy of claims to secessionist
self-determination, I must examine some basic facts with respect
to the history and development of the different secessionist
movements worldwide.

After each case study, the secessionist

movement rated according to the aforementioned theory.
there are two traps with such an approach.

However,

First, most political

scientists advocate secession only under certain conditions
mentioned in their theories.
a right (McGee 1992).

Secession is not a privilege but

When a group has the right to secede,

the theory provides a measure of the level of legitimacy present
in that society.

Second, when a group satisfies only a fraction

of the criteria its legitimacy to secede is lessened?

Many

people die on the altar of secession trying to exercise their
right.

A lot of money are spent to advance a secessionist cause.

These are some of the reasons why I say that this theory
determines the legitimacy of secessionist movements.
The case studies examined are the Katanga secession of
Congo, the Naga secession of India, the Kurd secession of Iraq,
15
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Syria, Turkey and U.S.S.R., the Bangladesh secession of Pakistan,
the Biafra secession of Nigeria, the Eritrea secession of
Ethiopia, the Equatorian secession of South Sudan and the Quebec
secession of Canada.
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CASE STUDIES
The Katanga Secession of Congo
Congo was the second-largest country in Africa on June
30 1960, at the time of its independence.

Katanga, its

southeastern province, declared its independence on July 11.
Out of all the African states that gained their independence
Congo was the least prepared state.

It was a meltingpot of

about 150 ethnic groups that spoke forty languages.

The three

largest ethnic groups were the Baluba, the Lunda and the Bayeke.
Since Katanga was the richest province of Congo, it was swamped
with immigrants from the neighboring province of Kasai
(Heraclides, 1991).
The secessionist party called Conakat formed in 1958 as
a reaction to the influx of poor immigrants, who amounted to
38% of the population.

The recruitment of the immigrants by

the mining companies, falling copper prices and the increasing
political activity of the immigrants all resulted in the
formation of Conakat.

Its purpose was the establishment of

a sovereign state that would be governed only by the Katangese.
However, the viability of Congo lay in the copper minefields
of Katanga.

The public sentiment favored full secession while

some of its leaders favored separatism.

The secessionist

movement died out in 1963 after the deterioration of relations
between the Katangese leaders and Belgium.

Furthermore, the

U.N.-US diplomatic offensive isolated the province economically
and politically, which led to the downfall of the Katanga regime.
Kennedy's administration advocated that Congo would not be viable
17
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without the province of Katanga and would thus fall in the hands
of the Communists (Heraclides, 1991).
The Katangese legitimized their secession with arguments
of violent atrocities by the host government, of legitimate
authority to rule their own homeland (based on election results),
of refusals by the host government to compromise and of the
economic benefits to the rest of the states of Central Africa
(Heraclides, 1991).
The Biafra Secession of Nigeria
Nigeria became independent in October 1960.

Seven years

later and after two coup attempts the Eastern region of Nigeria
seceded calling itself the Republic of Biafra.

Nigeria, like

Congo, was highly heterogeneous and consisted of more than 400
ethnic groups.

The rbo group comprised about 64% of the Eastern

region and were educated, economically affluent and held many
government positions.

The Northern region remained the most

dominant group until 1966, when a military group belonging to
the rbo group organized a coup.

The rbo of the Eastern region

remained in power for a year, until the Northern region organized
their own coup and regained control.

That coup lay the

foundation for the ensuing secessionist movement in the Eastern
region known as Biafra.

Massacres and atrocities ensued for

two years (until 1968), which brought about a million refugees
to the Eastern region.

The rest of Nigeria wanted a tight

federation, but the Easterners desired to achieve sovereignty.
Neither side was capable militarily of action.

Therefore, each

side attempted to penetrate the international system but with
18
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limited success.

Biafra fought well on the battlefield as well

as the diplomatic table, with help from the Nixon administration
and French arms (Heraclides 1991).
The arguments for the legitimacy of secession on the side
of Biafra were the pre-war massacres, the reluctance of the
Nigerian state to accept any other compromise except surrender,
the use of a land and marine blockade to starve the population,
the bombing of civilians and the cultural threat from the rest
of Nigeria (Heraclides 1991).
The Southern Sudan Secession
Sudan became independent on January 1 1956.

40% of the

population was Arab even though they were concentrated in the
north.

From 1930 on, the southern province of Equatoria was

treated separately from the northern by the English, so that
the Africans would not be subject to Arab culturalism and could
therefore develop a line of their own.

Southern Sudan became

a distinct entity both in their minds as well as in the minds
of foreigners as a result of British policy.

The Southerners

were African, black, underdeveloped, poor, rural and Christian,
while the Northerners were white, Arab, rich and Muslims.

The

infrastructure of the government lay mostly in the hands of
the Sudanese Arabs.

From 1947 until a few months prior to

Sudan's independence the Sudanese Africans pressed for a
federation or autonomy in order to rid themselves of the
second-class citizenship.

The Southerners tried to remedy the

situation by democratic means and were very close to obtaining
their goals by 1958.

However, a military coup by the North

19

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

vanished any hopes that the South might have of gaining some
political clout.
struggle.

By 1960 the Southerners resorted to an armed

Nevertheless, the Southerners could not mount the

same kind of international activity as the Biafrans or the
Katangans, as the oil reserves were not discovered until 1979.
By 1968 they wanted full sovereignty.

Soviet and radical Arab

involvement in the crisis was increasing.

The CIA and Israel

became involved in the mid-sixties but the war and the
secessionist movement ended in 1972 as it was forgotten in the
West.

Finally, no IGOs were directly involved in the conflict

(Heraclides 1991).
The arguments for the legitimacy of the South Sudanese
secessionist movement were mainly black nationalism,
self-determination, extreme inequality (politically and
economically), threat of assimilation by the Arabs, reluctance
on the part of the Arabs to even consider the Southern Sudaneses'
claims to autonomy or federalism and violent atrocities.
However, there was still some concern over the viability of
the aspiring state and inter-ethnic conflicts.
The Kurdistan Secession
Kurdistan is a nation divided between Syria, Iraq, Iran,
the Soviet Union and Turkey, as a result of the arbitrary carving
of states from the former Ottoman Empire after World War two.
The Kurdish have lived in the same vicinity since the Persian
Empire two thousand years ago.

However, it has assimilated

itself into a nation only from the turn of the century, even
though it was internationally recognized as a minority group
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before the formation of Iraq.

The treaty of Sevres in 1922,

which provided autonomy to the Kurds, was replaced by the new
treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

On January 22 1946 the Kurds of

Iran declared their independence, which lasted for a year until
it was crushed by the Shah of Iran.

During the 60s and the

70s the Kurds held fundraisers for promotional purposes in
Lausanne, but could not sustain international interest.
their goal was vague.

However,

Some of the leaders wanted autonomy,

others tight or loose federation and others wanted a
confederation.
The Bangladesh Secession of Pakistan
Pakistan became independent in 1947 when it was part of
India.

This action separated the Muslims from the Hindus.

It is difficult to carry out an analysis on this conflict based
on religion.

It is also necessary to carry out an analysis

of the social and cultural factors imposed by the British rule
(Heraclides 1991 and Kumar 1990).
There were two wings in Pakistan at the time of its
formation.

They split in 1971 because the West Pakistanis and

the Eastern Pakistanis had linguistic (very few East Pakistanis
could speak Urdu, the official language of Pakistan), cultural
and social differences.

Communication and transportation

problems ensued as soon as Pakistan was formed due to the great
distance that spans between them.

East and West Pakistan were

never one nation, as they had no common history, no common
consciousness or ethnicity (Heraclides 1991).

In fact, the

first signs of nationalism were present in the 1830s (Soumitra
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1992).

The Pakistani leaders wanted to forge a nation

(Heraclides 1991).

East Pakistan was relatively homogeneous,

while West Pakistan was trying to unify its four ethnic groups
(Burcheit 1978).

Economic conditions for the East Pakistanis

went from bad to worse, as a result of extreme corruption
(Heraclides 1991 and Burcheit 1978).
proposed a system of loose federation.

In 1966 the East Pakistanis
The election system

changed to one-man one-vote in 1970, which gave an overwhelming
majority to East Pakistan in the legislature.

The East

Pakistanis started to strengthen their military.
wanted nothing short of complete independence.
Pakistani Army occupied
during that year.

In 1971 they
The West

Bangladesh (East Bengal before 1946)

The Pakistani Air Force attacked India's

airfields and started a war on December 4 1971, which ended
with Bangladesh's independence days later (Heraclides 1991).
Bangladesh's main arguments for legitimacy of their
secessionist movement was self-determination, atrocities during
the late 60s, linguistic, cultural differences, discriminatory
redistribution (as evident from the per capita income difference
between West and East Pakistan), absence of any historical or
ethnic ties (Heraclides 1991).

The main motive for secession

in East Pakistan has been associated with socio-economic factors
such as the contradictions between big traders and the poor.
These factors were largely ignored by India and the rest of
the world (Kumar 1990).

Therefore, the majority of states in

the U.N. voted against the secession (Heraclides 1991 l.
The Eritrean Secession of Ethiopia
22

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Ethiopia is the only African country that has not been
colonized by the West.

The Italians tried to colonize the region

in the late 30s, but were beaten in the battle of Adowa.

The

government remained autocratic until 1974 when the king Selassie
was deposed.

Eritrea was a region on the northeast boundaries

of Ethiopia effectively blocking Ethiopia's access to the Red
Sea.

At the time of annexation the population of Eritrea

numbered four million, which was about 10% of the total Ethiopian
population with the land percentage being about the same.

The

population living in Eritrea was fairly homogeneous comprised
of an equal number of Muslims and Tigrinyans (Heraclides 1991).
The Soviet Union advocated self-determination in the form of
full sovereignty, while the US favored the king's position of
a loose federation.

Therefore, the U.N. established a federation

with Ethiopia and Eritrea as its two federated states in 1950.
However, there were sporadic arguments for secession from the
late 40s.

Their targets for political support included

neighboring African states such as Egypt, Libya, Somalia, as
well as the US and Israel.

However, in 1976 the Eritreans

switched to the Soviet camp and received support only from
conservative African states.

During the 60s Ethiopia succeeded

in annexing the Eritrean region and reducing its Assembly to
a powerless entity.

The armed struggle of the Eritreans started

in 1961 as a result of the annexation and continues currently
(Heraclides 1991).
The Eritrean arguments for the legitimacy of their
secessionist movement include self-determination, atrocities
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from the king, oppression, black colonialism, the abolishment
of the freedom to assemble, to free speech, free elections to
the point of suspension of the Eritrean constitution (Heraclides
1991).
The Naga Secession of India
The Naga are situated in the northeast region of India.
They reside in a highly heterogeneous part of India.

The Naga

are Mongolian in origin and retain a distinct cultural
background.
differences.

They are divided into 14 tribes with some linguistic
From the time of the British occupation on through

the Indian independence they were treated differently and
isolated, effectively becoming second-class citizens.

In 1947

the Naga opted for autonomy with an option to secede in ten
years.

Therefore, in 1956 they requested full independence

but were denied by the Indian government.

Many riots ensued

(Bucheit 1978).
However, the political situation changed in 1962 when the
Indian government changed its stance and its constitution in
order to calm down the riots.

In 1963 India declared that the

Nagaland was given the full rights of statehood within India.
The Naga were not satisfied and again declared full independence.
They explained that their territory was never conquered by the
Indian Army, but was forced into a union with India by the
British.

They subsequently turned down a plea of autonomy from

India, but accepted a cease-fire which lasted from 1964 to 1972.
However, by 1967 they were receiving support from Pakistan and
China.

The successful secession of Bangladesh diverted troops
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to Nagaland and the Naga themselves could not use Bangladesh
as their guerrilla battlefield.

Therefore, from 1971 on their

military power was minimized and subsequently put down in 1975.
The secessionist leaders were given amnesty.

The result was

that Nagaland remained a state within India.

Many Naga saw

this as a favorable turnout of the conflict, as they gained
their cultural autonomy.

Secession may not have been a perfect

idea anymore, since Nagaland would not have survived politically
and economically (Bucheit 1978).
The arguments for the legitimacy of the Nagaland
secessionist movement were self-determination, atrocities by
undisciplined Indian troops.

Nevertheless, their population

was not homogeneous and the Naga leaders could not prove that
their cause was supported by a majority of the population
(Bucheit 1978).
The Quebec Secession of Canada
Canada is a heterogeneous confederate country with a
population of about 23 million, two-thirds of which speak
English.

The rest speak French and reside within the boundaries

of Quebec, comprising about 80% of the state's population.
Their economy and culture is largely dominated by the
Anglo-Canadians.

Therefore, most Franco-Canadians were

dissatisfied with the present situation.

Since the 50s Franco

Canadians's numbers and income seem to declining, while the
unemployment rate has risen (Flowers 1984).
Bilingualism started in 1867 when the French were defeated
by the British and resulted in a federated country.
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on Canada accepted this dispersed nationalism and slowly began
to change from an agrarian society to a structure
and industrial megalopolis.

of urban

By 1960 the Francophones started

to implement a plan to raise their income and status.

During

the 60s and early 70s a blossom of new secessionist parties
and terrorist organizations promoted an independent Quebec.
The general population, however, was not too keen on
independence.

Its major ally has been France.

Presidents De

Gaulle and Giscard d'Estaing overtly gave support for a free
Quebec, while

reaping personal benefits from their

in upcoming elections.

speeches

In 1980 there was a referendum posed

by Parti Quebecois, the ruling party since 1976, which opted
for sovereignty of Quebec.

However, most of the French

population said no to independence.

From then on Quebec tried

to muster internal support for its cause instead of seeking
international recognition.
non-radical and non-violent.

Nationalism was difficult to exploit,
The case of Quebec has shown that

even though international organizations fail to recognize
secessionist movements as wholes they may recognize ethnic groups
seeking only autonomy.

SUMMARY

Examining the case studies I sought to find out how they
fit the theory on the legitimacy of secession.

First, the

secessionist movements of Katanga, Sudan, Bangladesh and Eritrea
had a defined territorial base.

They defined their territory

through the use of the host state's external borders and
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administrative internal subdivisions.
a territory defined culturally.

The remaining four had

The defined territory enveloped

members of the ethnic group arbitrarily, transgressing borders
of sovereign states.
Second, the secessionist movements of Sudan, Kurdistan,
Bangladesh and Eritrea brought about an increase in global
diversity.

They were unique culturally and historically.

The

remaining movements had citizens in neighboring countries which
did not want to become part of the secession.

The Katangese

ethnic groups could be found in the rest of Congo, while there
was a small amount of white colonialists.

The Ibo citizens

of Biafra could be found in the rest of Nigeria, while the Naga
were basically Indians that evolved to adapt to the Himalayas.
The Franco-phones of Quebec are nothing more than Canadians
speaking French.

A similar culture can be found in the rest

of Canada and France.
Third, the secessionist movements in Biafra, Sudan,
Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Nagaland observed changes
in their original goals and aspirations of the host state after
its formation.

Most of the aforementioned ethnic groups were

forced to join the arbitrarily carved post-colonial states.
The Katangese secession could not have been due to these changes
as independence was sought days after the independence of Congo.
The secession of Quebec also could not be attributed to these
changes, as it has its own legislature and enjoys partial
autonomy in a federal system.
Fourth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra,
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Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh and Eritrea were victims of
discriminatory redistribution.

Resources were systematically

drawn out of these regions and invested in the rest of the host
state.

The Naga were nomads and could not be asssesed any taxes.

Furthermore, resources were scarse in the Himalayas.

In the

case of Quebec the majority of the taxes stayed within the state
of Quebec, while the other regions of Quebec enjoyed the same
standard of living.
Fifth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Bangladesh,
Eritrea and Nagaland sought an increase in the efficiency of
their public administration infrastructure.

In most cases the

host states were either too large to assume the basic
responsibilities of a state efficiently or too underdeveloped
to support the seceding region.

In the extreme case of

Bangladesh, the host country Pakistan was thousand of miles
away.

Biafra's and Quebec's administrative structures were

at the same level of development as in the rest of Nigeria and
Canada respectively.
Sixth, the secessionist movements in Sudan, Kurdistan,
Bangladesh, Eritrea and Quebec were fueled by primordial
nationalism.

They were homogenious and compact.

The Katangese

secession was supported by 150 different ethnic groups, while
the Biafran by more than 400 and the Naga by about 14.
Seventh, the secessionist movements in Sudan, Kurdistan,
Bangladesh, Eritrea and Quebec aimed at the preservation of
a distinct culture.

Some features that can be attributed to

a distinct culture include common language, tradition, history
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and religion.

Again. the movements in Katanga, Biafra and

Nagaland were too heterogenious to constitute a distinct culture.
Eighth, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra,
Sudan, Kurdistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea and Nagaland anticipated
external threat either from the host state or from a third state.
Most of the movements were characterized by numerous deaths
of supporters.

The only movement that has not anticipated any

form of physical threat is the one in Quebec.
Ninth, the secessionist movements in Sudan and Kurdistan
were victims of rectificatory injustice.

Sudan was taken by

the Arabs and slowly assimilated, while Kurdistan was dismembered
by Turkey, Syria and Iraq.

The rest of the movements had

cultural control over their land but not political.
Finally, the secessionist movements in Katanga, Biafra,
Sudan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, and Quebec are considered to be
viable in case secession is successful.

The subjective decision

is based on their overall economic situation, the presence of
natural resources and their prospects for free trade.
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Figure 1 summarizes the results.
Points of Theory

Kat. Bfr. Sud. Kur. Ban. Eri. Nag. Qbc.

1.Territory

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

2.Incr. in diversity

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

3.Changed goals

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

4.Discrim. Redistr.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

5.Incr. in effie.

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

6.Primord. national.

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

7.Cultural preserv.

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

8.Anticip. of threat

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

9.Rectif. injustice

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

10.Viability/Trade

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Total # of Yes

5/10 4/10 9/10 7/10 9/10 9/10 3/10 3/10

Summing up the results from the examination of case studies
I observe that the theory holds true.

There are four nations

that have scored high, meaning they have a high degree of
legitimacy with their people and may still be holding strong.
First, there is one nation that has already seceded, Bangladesh,
which places highly on the legitimacy scale with a relative
score of 9/10.

Other nations that are very likely to secede

are the Sudanese-Africans (9/10), the Kurds (7/10) and the
Eritreans (9/10).

Second, there have been four nations that

have either compromised with their host state or died out due
to low support

They are the Katangese (5/10), the Biafrans

(4/10), the Naga (3/10) and the Quebecois (3/10).

It is

interesting to note that the last two nations are the ones that
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have either compromised to autonomy or federal status and have
scored the lowest of them all.

Therefore, it is my opinion

that this theory fits the framework of international secessionist
movements and should be used to measure their legitimacy or
degree of solidarity.

In a normative and liberal framework

every secessionist movement succeeds.

However, this theory

is more practical than normative.
The secessionist movements with high levels of legitimacy
(more than 5/10) are more likely to be supported by the United
Nations and the IGOs and thus succeed, whereas the ones with
low levels of legitimacy (less than 5/10) are more likely to
compromise.

Buchanan (1991b) points out that the right to

self-determination is vague and does not necessarily mean
sovereignty.

Low legitimacy secessionist movements may be

encouraged to try other forms of self-determination, such as
autonomy, federalism, confederalism.

In a democratic state

political power is divided evenly among the members of the state.
Other possible solutions for low legitimacy secessionist
movements include the acceptance of special rights within the
host state accorded only to members of the seceding group, such
as a guaranteed number of seats in the legislature irrespective
of their population percentage.

The host state may implement

longer residency requirements so as not to change the population
demographics within the seceding region.

It can accord special

group property rights to members of the seceding group to
discourage non-members from acquiring land within the seceding
region.

All these measures can be implemented instead of
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secession, which can satisfy the requirements of both the host
state and the seceding group.
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